Druze Mountain on fire: Israel and al-Sharaa playing for credibility

Roman ruins in Shahba, part of Syria’s Suwayda province, in 2011. csi

Guest commentary by Fabrice Balanche

A version of this article was originally published in French in Conflits on July 16, 2025.

A sectarian conflict

On July 13, a Druze man in southern Syria was kidnapped by an armed Sunni Arab group manning a checkpoint. The group comes from the settled Bedouin minority in the Druze Mountain, with whom there have been recurring conflicts.

In 2001, a Druze man defending his field from a herd belonging to his Bedouin neighbors was murdered. The resulting violence killed several people and sparked a massive anti-Assad demonstration by the Druze community of the Druze Mountain. The Druze accused Assad of favoring the Bedouins.

Today, we face a similar situation, with the new Syrian government supporting the Bedouins in the region against the Druze militias, who do not want to see the province of Suwayda (Druze Mountain) under the government’s control. Suwayda province, with about 350,000 inhabitants, including 150,000 in the city of Suwayda, has an overwhelmingly Druze majority (over 90%). Sunni and Christian individuals each represent 5% of the population. While some Christians live in an area near Suwayda, many are spread across the Mountain, often adjacent to Druze communities.

Upon the emergence of a Sunni Islamic government, the Bedouin community in Druze Mountain, who are themselves Sunni, experienced a surge of confidence. These tribes aspire for the new administration to disarm the Druze, thereby granting them authority over their territory. Due to their accelerated demographic expansion and intertribal alliances which span Syria, they stand poised to dominate the most desirable lands in the not-so-distant future. The Sunni residents of Daraa are also eager to seize the Druze Mountain and seek revenge against the Druze community, which largely remained loyal (by inaction) to the Assad regime during the conflict.

Furthermore, the Druze are viewed as apostates by Islamists. The fatwa issued by the Mufti of Palestine in 1932, which recognized them as Muslims like the Alawites, was not enough to protect them from fundamentalism, especially when it was mixed with predation.

Uniting through steel and blood

From the very beginning of the clashes in Suwayda in July, the new regime’s security forces invaded the Druze Mountain to “restore order.” In reality, they were trying to take over the province, just as they did in May with the Druze towns near Damascus (Jaramana, Sahnaya and Jdaydeh Artuz). Ahmad al-Sharaa wants Syria to be a united Islamic republic, and he does not allow for any kind of local autonomy.

After a conflict, the common approach is to reunite the country and disarm the militias, creating a national army. The Syrian government seems to have the support of the Gulf oil monarchies, Turkey, and Western countries for this project. However, the future of the affected populations is a cause for concern following the massacre of 2,000 Alawites in March 2025 and 100 Druzes in Damascus in May 2025. Indeed, the al-Sharaa regime is far from democracy or inclusivity, despite its rhetoric of tolerance toward religious and ethnic minorities.

On July 14, al-Sharaa’s forces invaded Suwayda with tanks, artillery, and drones, bombarding Druze positions. They then subjected civilians to abuses, killing dozens of them solely because they were Druze. Homes were burned, and shops were looted. Meanwhile, the new government’s communication services broadcast reassuring videos of security forces protecting citizens and recovering weapons.

Government-controlled media has been promoting Laith Balous, the leader of the Druze militia “Men of Dignity,” who denounces other groups as illegal, pro-Assad gangs. He has encouraged community members to disarm and welcome the newly established Syrian military. In fact, this leader of the militia was expelled from the Druze Mountains in May, having been deemed a traitor. He had already aligned himself with al-Sharaa by December 2024. His goal was to become the leader of the Druze in Syria and to avenge the death of his father, who was murdered in September 2015 for his alleged treachery towards the Bashar al-Assad regime.

Remember that, at the time, various Druze clans had created militias to protect their mountains from attacks by Sunni rebels, the Islamic State, and al-Nusra. (See Policy Watch: The Druze and Assad: Strategic Bedfellows | The Washington Institute). Today, these same Druze militias, who control the region, refuse to disarm by the same forces that fought against them beforehand. This explains their fierce resistance. But al-Sharaa is resolute in his determination to seize the Druze Mountain. This is essential to his image among his soldiers, as well as his plan for authoritarian reunification.

The Druze Mountain and the Golan Heights: Is it the same struggle?

Israel is openly hostile towards al-Sharaa, as they prefer a federal Syria as a guarantee of protection for minorities and to exploit internal weakness (see Fikra, February 2025: Rebuilding Syria May Require Federalism | The Washington Institute). Despite the new regime’s overtures toward it, its willingness to discuss a peace agreement, and even its offer to rejoin the Abraham Accords, Israel’s leaders do not seem confident in a more amicable future. They believe that al-Sharaa, known as al-Jolani (the Golanese), will never stop trying to take back the Golan Heights. Once firmly in power in a unified Syria, they fear he will cause problems for Israel.

Under these circumstances, protecting the Druze minority in Syria is essential for the demilitarization of the country’s southern region and the security of the Golan Heights. Israel’s strategic interests are at odds with the Syrian Druzes’ desire for autonomy, but the Israeli Druzes’ solidarity with their Syrian counterparts strengthens their cause. On July 16, the leader of the Israeli Druze, Sheikh Muwafaq Tarifa, even asked his community to stop serving in the Israeli military if the Jewish state refuse to intervene seriously to protect the Syrian Druze. This matter has since escalated into a domestic concern for the government, which is already struggling due to the departure of the United Torah Judaism party, which opposes mandatory military service for Orthodox Jews. This is a real paradox, as the Druze themselves are active participants in defending Israel.

The administration of Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel is determined to maintain its domestic and international reputation by supporting the Druze community in Syria. Forsaking them would lead to their downfall and potential massacre, like the fate of the Alawites in March. Capturing the Druze Mountain would solidify Ahmad al-Sharaa’s political power in Syria, as it would be perceived as a triumph over Israel, the supposed protector of the Druze. This would enable him to attack the Kurds without consequence. The United States has pulled out all its military facilities from the area between Hasakeh and Deir al-Zor. It is evident that Israel’s and the United States’ interests differ in Syria. Despite this, Benjamin Netanyahu remains unfazed by calls for restraint, as even Donald Trump’s attempts to curb his actions prove futile when it comes to matters of Israel’s security.

Will al-Sharaa be willing to endure humiliation? The airstrike on the Damascus Defense Ministry carries a sinister message. It will be intriguing to observe soon whether the Syrian leader has reached the pinnacle of his pragmatism.

 

Fabrice Balanche is an assistant professor of geography at the University of Lyon 2, and he served as the director of the Urban Observatory of the Near East at the IFPO, the French Institute of the Near East. Last year, he received the Geopolitical Book Prize for his publication of Les leçons de la crise syrienne.