Fabrice Balanche is a leading Syria expert and a member of CSI’s Board of Advisers.
CSI-Germany: In March 2025, the new Islamist authorities in Syria carried out indiscriminate attacks on Alawites in coastal areas, killing thousands. The Alawite massacre came three months after a coalition of rebel groups headed by the jihadist HTS overthrew Syria’s dictatorship, headed by President Bashar al-Assad, himself an Alawite Muslim. How do you assess the situation of the Alawites, who had close links to the previous regime?
The Assad family, father and son, wielded influence over the Alawite community. Hafez al-Assad seized power with the help of Alawite military personnel in 1970, then systematically promoted them in the military and state apparatus. This led to greater social mobility for the entire community, which went from being impoverished, illiterate farmers to holding jobs as civil servants or soldiers, both positions offering stable salaries and protection against starvation. It is not accurate to claim that all Alawites thrived under the regime and rose above the rest of the Syrian people. During the civil war, Bashar al-Assad used the Alawites to protect his rule. They demonstrated loyalty due to their desire to maintain the benefits they had obtained through political clientelism over the years. However, they also feared being targeted by Sunni Islamists, who consider them as heretics and therefore worthy of eradication. The Assad regime deliberately cultivated this fear to ensure the allegiance of its Alawite military force. Unfortunately, the threat of Sunni revenge is not a fictional scenario in this Middle East of “murderous identities,” as Amin Maalouf’s book describes.
Collective punishment is being inflicted on the Alawites. They are considered by supporters of the new Islamist regime to be “fulul” (collaborators), and by the radicals, as heretics. The massacres in March 2025, which left more than 5,000 dead, according to my own estimates, and not 1,400 according to official sources, marked the beginning of a wave of persecution that continues to force them to leave.
Every day, Alawites are murdered, women are kidnapped and forced into marriages with jihadists, entire families are uprooted, and so on. Hundreds of thousands of Alawite public servants have lost their jobs. Retired soldiers remain confined to their homes, denied identity cards, despite Ahmad al-Sharaa’s pledges of reconciliation when he assumed power in December 2025.
The future of Christianity in Syria is in doubt. The bombing of a church in a suburb of Damascus in June 2025 served as a wake-up call to the Christian minority. What is the current situation of Christians—and what about their future?
There are just over 200,000 Christians left in Syria, representing only one percent of the population, down from 1.2 million in 2011, or five percent. Most of those remaining are elderly and impoverished, and they cannot leave their homes. As a result, the Christian community faces the risk of dying out.
However, this decline is exacerbated by the ongoing instability and safety concerns for minority groups. The attack on Mar Elias church, on June 2025, has caused a sense of alarm, as people are hesitant to attend church, despite the presence of law enforcement officers. There is a fear that these very same officers might indiscriminately fire their weapons at the congregants.
Meanwhile, Christian villages are under threat from Sunni communities who want to take over their land. The al-Sharaa regime does not intend to annihilate Eastern Christians, as they recognize their significance to Western powers. However, they are unable to prevent Sunni Arab tribes and radical Islamists from targeting them.
Lastly, we must not forget the Christians of Jazira, particularly in Qamishli, who live in the Kurdish-controlled region. The very survival of these entities hangs in the balance due to the impending clash between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Ahmad al-Sharaa.
For almost a year now, the former Christian mayor Suleiman Khalil has been detained by the new regime without charges. His daughter believes that the Christian minority is being politically sidelined. Is this true? What is the position of the Syrian bishops in the new regime?
The established religious hierarchy willingly defers to the centuries-old power structure to ensure its own survival. In the case of Suleiman Khalil, the Church remains silent to avoid offending the newly established authorities. The fear is that further bombings in churches will drive out the remaining Christian communities, and lead to their schools being closed and their communal (waqf) properties seized.
Only a few bishops, such as Bishop Mourad, the Syriac Catholic Bishop of Homs, still enjoy freedom of expression. They are, of course, highly critical of the new government.
What about the Kurds and the Druze?
The Druzes and the Alawites are considered heretics by the new Islamist regime. However, unlike the Alawites, the Druzes have armed militias, which allows them to defend their territory.
In the spring of 2025, the Druze strongholds (Jaramana, Sahnaya and Jdaydeh Artuz) in the Damascus suburbs were reclaimed by the regime after violent clashes that killed hundreds. Subsequently, Ahmad al-Sharaa made two attempts to capture Jabal Druze, to the southeast of Damascus. The first was with his regular troops. When that failed, he ordered a tribal uprising, with its attendant right to plunder. Over 2,000 Druze were killed, plus the evangelical pastor of Suwayda and his whole family. Dozens of villages were emptied, including several Christian ones. Israeli support allowed the Druze militias to repel al-Sharaa’s troops. Currently, they are seeking autonomy for the Jabal Druze region, protected by Israel, due to the impossibility of allying with such a government.
The Kurds are just as despised as the Alawites and the Druzes, despite being Sunni Muslims. The jihadists question their allegiance to Islam, as the Kurds are not particularly devout and many of them see Islam as the religion of the Arab colonizers. Racism against the Kurds is also widespread. They are not considered Syrians because they are not Arabs. They have fought against both ISIS and al-Sharaa’s troops in Aleppo. Syria’s new leadership holds animosity towards them and is not genuinely committed to integrating the SDF into the Syrian army on an equal footing. Once their military structure is disbanded, the Kurds fear becoming al-Sharaa’s next target. That is why they advocate for local self-governance and the preservation of security forces to protect themselves.
What external powers do you currently see as still exerting decisive influence in Syria? Observers initially described the “new” Damascus as a vassal of Turkish President Erdoğan.
Indeed, Turkey is the dominant force in Syria. It has made a slight concession to Saudi Arabia to deter Riyadh from funding anti-regime groups. However, it is Ankara that wields influence over Ahmad al-Sharaa. With over 20,000 troops on the ground in Syria and the allegiance of the ex-Syrian National Army’s militias, numbering around 50,000 men, Turkey wields considerable influence.
The recent assault on the Kurdish district of Aleppo, Sheikh Maqsoud, demonstrates Turkey’s ongoing military maneuvers in Syria. Their objectives in the country are twofold. Firstly, they aim to establish Syria as a Turkish protectorate, in line with their neo-Ottoman ambitions. Secondly, they seek to eliminate the Kurdish entity of Rojava, which emerged from the civil war in the northeastern part of the country.
The Kurds of Turkey must not be fooled into thinking that Rojava can be replicated in southeastern Anatolia. In the coming weeks, unless the United States vetoes it, Turkish-backed al-Sharaa forces will cross the Euphrates and attack the Syrian Democratic Forces.
Al-Sharaa, who is leading the country on an interim basis, was previously a leader, founder, and member of Islamist-jihadist militias. What networks does he have that shape the Syrian government today?
Ahmad al-Sharaa spent two decades as part of jihadist organizations before becoming “interim” President of Syria. He was a member of the Islamic State in Iraq until 2011, when he returned to Syria with a group of jihadists to take part in the uprising against Bashar al-Assad with the support of Al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State in Iraq. He founded the al-Nusra Front, but disagreements soon emerged between him and his mentor, who also wanted to control the jihad in Syria. In 2013, the al-Nusra Front split into two factions: one pro-al-Qaeda, led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, alias Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, and the other led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Ahmad al-Sharaa reportedly distanced himself from Al-Qaeda with an official break in 2016. However, his men continue to wear the Al-Qaeda logo, as I witnessed firsthand on my recent trips to Syria. He wisely avoided confrontation with the West, so his fighters were not targeted by the international coalition against the Islamic State established by Barack Obama in 2014. He even gained credibility as a potential alternative to Bashar al-Assad, first in the eyes of Turkey, which protected him during the war, and then in the eyes of the West. However, this is undoubtedly an Islamist regime that wants to eliminate the country’s minorities and impose Sharia law. Currently, it is in a conciliatory phase towards the West and downplays its coercive actions. However, this won’t last. We have already seen the Alawite and Druze massacres, and now the Kurds are the target.
It is claimed that al-Sharaa has distanced himself from his jihadist roots. Can you confirm this?
I am sceptical of Ahmad al-Sharaa’s claimed ideological shift away from jihadism. His new suit and trimmed beard are an attempt to seduce us. It is highly unlikely that someone who spent two decades in a jihadist organization linked to al-Qaeda and eventually rose to its leadership would suddenly undergo a complete ideological transformation. Al-Sharaa is a skilled politician who hides his true intentions. However, he is not promoting democracy in Syria, but rather working against it. Although the leader may appear to be moderating his actions in an attempt to mend ties with the global community, this is not the case for those in his inner circle, specifically his military forces. He has even appointed radical foreign jihadists to his general staff, and they remain unrepentant.
In the past, the United States placed a $10 million bounty on al-Sharaa’s head; recently, former CIA Director David Petraeus shared a stage with al-Sharaa in New York. How credible is the West’s call for democracy and human rights—key justifications for Assad’s overthrow—if it now courts al-Sharaa?
David Petraeus received a substantial amount of money from Qatar in exchange for his services. Doha is financing Ahmad al-Sharaa’s media campaign with its billions. Researchers, journalists, politicians, and others are being bribed by the small emirate to support the new Syrian regime. Ahmad al-Sharaa’s victory represents Qatar’s revenge against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which had reestablished ties with Bashar al-Assad few years ago. Qatar is a close ally of Turkey – Ankara protected Doha during the 2017 blockade orchestrated by Qatar’s Arab neighbours, with Riyadh leading the charge.
The West displays a remarkable lack of discernment, conflating its desires with the realities of the situation. Just as it was fooled in 2011 when it believed Assad would be toppled in a matter of weeks by a secular and democratic uprising, it now seems to be duped by the new Syrian regime, assuming that once in power, jihadists will magically transform into moderate actors. This is akin to the naive hope that Hitler, upon becoming chancellor, would miraculously embrace democracy. Probably, we will have also the “night of the long knives,” Al-Sharaa eliminating the most undisciplined jihadists, but not the more radical. In Syria, the path is clear towards the establishment of an authoritarian Islamic republic. The West only requires that the nation be stable and “inclusive”, but it makes no demands regarding democracy. The demands for Syria democratization have noticeably decreased, which can be interpreted as realistic or as a lack of courage.
What prospects for the future does Syria have?
Syria is becoming an authoritarian Islamic republic. The exodus of minorities will result in the ethnic and religious homogenization of the country, with Sunni Arabs becoming the dominant group. Secularists are also departing, as they cannot bear the increasing influence of Islamism.
